dissecting what it is that we are trying to achieve in light of who we are as a nation and where we find our perceived interests threatened.
In the midst of these debates, the military, specifically the Army and Marine analysis of the struggles we are facing in many parts of the world.
As we approach the question that is the title or this paper, it is important to deconstruct the problem. First we will reexamine the nature of war, deduce why entities make war, consider the context of conflict of war today, and examine weather ethnonational conflict is a counterinsurgency, and the appropriateness of a that the common dictionary definition of war, "the struggle between opposing forces or for a particular end," 4 and Clausewitz's combine adequately to represent the doctrinally accepted usage of the term. 5 Therefore this paper proposes the following definition:
War is an act of force between opposing people(s) in pursuit of a desired goal, condition, or objective. 6 Why We Fight ?
Why do we desire things that put us at odds with other humans and the existing power structure to get into the position of power? Given that war and peace are on a continuum of human conflict, understanding the dynamics that inspire conflict is essential to developing a theory to deal with the myriad locales on the scale of human conflict. Arguably, there are two reasons that people fight from a conscientious or active point of view. The first is security or self preservation and the second is self interest. There may be a third reason that is unconscious or reactive, but that will take some further research and analysis and is not necessarily germane to this discussion from a practical cause and effect analysis in that it is reactive and generally facilitating but not a motivating cause. Breaking the two active motives into distinct groups does not place them in an exclusive position. Often conflict will evolve or harbor aspects of both motives simultaneously. is the active aspect and the reactive or inactive aspect is more akin to the means with which we fight or protect ourselves and therefore is part of our nature, but is subject to the influences of the other drives in a Freudian sense. If one were to draw a parallel using the mystery of the trinity in Christianity it would be that the active was the Father and Son and the reactive would be the Holy Spirit (that which enables the Father and Son or the Ways).
The catalogue of trinities suggests there are only two active reasons why people fight. Man is motivated to initiate conflict through his action or reaction to just two influences. Self preservation or security of a civilian group and their social interests (identity), and security of economic ends, ways and means (stability and prosperity) are the two reasons conflict develops. This could also be stated more simply as self preservation and self interests. If one party or group feels that the other is disinterested in their situation or feels that the other threatens their identity in some way, in either reality or perception, their security is at risk. This is true for economic security as well.
If certain groups of people feel that they may not share equitably in a states' wealth due to an actual or perceived prejudice, cause for concern and anxiety is natural. 13 If not stabilized the situation may devolve into violent conflict. 14 
Context of Conflict Today
Given the current state of conflict since the end of the Cold War it is probably not a stretch to note that the rise in terrorism and non-state actors are arguably an emerging form of ethno-national conflict. 15 The conflict inspired by identity preservation is primarily ideologically based and is not prone to secular rationality. This is not to say that there is no rationality, but that it is based on an ideology or canon. In addition, economic globalization has fostered a fertile ground for non-state attempts at self determination to protect themselves from genocide or subjugation. This has emboldened ethno-national groups to reassert themselves due to a sense that they will either be assimilated or subjugated by another ethnic group. 16 Friedman's -olive tree‖ is mostly about ethnicity:
Olive trees [ethnicity] are important. They represent everything that roots us, anchors us, identifies us and locates us in the world-whether it be belonging to a family, a community, a tribe, a nation, a religion or, most of all, a place called home.
Olive trees are what give us the warmth of family, the joy of individuality, the intimacy of personal rituals, the depth of private relationships, as well as the confidence and security to reach out and encounter others. We fight so intensely at times over our olive trees because, at their best, they provide the feelings of self-esteem and belonging that are as essential for human survival as food in the belly. Indeed, one reason that the nation-state will never disappear, even if it does weaken, is because it is the ultimate olive tree-the ultimate expression of whom we belong to -linguistically, geographically, and historically. You cannot be a complete person alone. You can be a rich person alone. You can be a smart person alone. But you cannot be a complete person alone. For that you must be part of, and rooted in, an olive grove. 17 Therefore, one could postulate that for the foreseeable future conflict is likely to be typified by fledging ethno-national movements that are primarily intra-state, transstate and non-state groups that could threaten larger state structures if not contained.
Given that most of the conflicts in the modern era are arguably inspired by ethnonational movements where a group's identity is threatened (reason one for fighting) and that the rise of an ethnic or national group is a threat to the interest of many state actors (reason two for fighting). While the rise of a group could use any number of means to initiate conflict, terrorism and insurgent activities come to mind immediately (the third reactive and enabling pillar of the trilogy).
As we migrate from the why people fight to examining the strategy itself it is imperative to examine the type and nature of the conflict or war. This should be done both empirically and rationally to ensure that one form of philosophy does not deny the other its usefulness. If this approach is not adopted then it is likely that cognitive biases will not be mitigated by reason and rationalization will not be moderated by historically empirical information. This balance is critical; conflict often evolves to a state that does not resemble what it was at the outset and the reasons for fighting it are linked to the type, scale, and context of the conflict as it evolves.
Several recent operations, including Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan provide an appropriate case study for illuminating contemporary conflicts that the United
States is involved in, and those most likely to involve the use of military force to compel an adversary or entity towards our will for the foreseeable future. In all of these case studies, the United States could field dominant military forces either regionally or globally unilaterally or as the lead in a coalition. The use of force in a preemptive manner was and is currently considered nationally acceptable and legitimate despite an international or regional cohort that may view the action as unacceptable or illegitimate.
This is a key aspect to peace operations and preemptive war.
A selective historical, strategic, and operational-level campaign analysis of these conflicts should serve to illuminate the importance of thoroughly examining, framing, and analyzing a national strategic interest and objectives prior to deciding that the use of military force to compel an entity is desirable. There are two obvious non-exclusive outcomes that could result from this perspective analysis. The first outcome may be a revelation or realization that the national interest or objective is not vital or desirable and the second outcome may be an alternative application of the elements of national power that may not include the use of the military to compel as the primary tool or may direct a new military approach or doctrine. The acme of success in strategy and operational art is to accurately predict and portray the future rather than provide fodder for failure. Our case study will address the alternate application of the elements of power by addressing two distinct ways of waging war and their doctrines. Although there is a lot of commonality between these methods, they influence the ends (aim or objective) in a subtle but significant manner.
In response, the basic strategic approach could be one of two that have been facilitate the transition to legitimate governance‖. 18 In broad terms it includes peace keeping, peace building, peace enforcement, peacemaking, and conflict prevention; these terms are incidentally part on the terms used in the United Nations Charter and are commonly accepted to refer to authorities and scope of peace operations. 19 It consists of tactical offensive and defensive security operations and counter terrorism operations as an offensive subset to a more general set of security operations oriented on the opposing force, faction separation, the government, area or resource that needs to be protected. This strategy is currently being utilized in the Sinai, Bosnia, and
Kosovo. In the Sinai, it is termed a peace keeping operation stemming primarily from conducted…in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief‖. 24 The safe and secure portions of this mission mainly consists of tactical offensive and defensive security operations and counter terrorism operations as an offensive subset to a more general set of security operations oriented on the opposing force, faction separation, the government, area or resource that needs to be protected. In general terms this is primarily an area security operation at the tactical and operational levels. Edward
Luttwak would describe this as a -point defense‖ theater strategy that has been adopted in response to guerilla and insurgent forces; this is a strategy that has been used extensively since the time of the Roman Empire. 25 In all of these approaches the key ingredient is a common interest concurrence between the population and the security forces that are facilitating stability and security. Stability operations facilitate the physiological needs of individuals and security operations facilitate the security needs of individual and this in turn serves the first two needs in Maslow's hierarchy and provides for interest concurrence.
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The second approach that has been utilized by the United States is a counterinsurgency strategy. This is the current strategy that is being utilized in Iraq and Afghanistan. 27 Doctrinally counterinsurgency is a subset of the larger category of irregular warfare. Irregular warfare is on par with peace operations in military hierarchical terms and is defined as a -violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over a population.‖ 28 Additionally, foreign internal defense, combating terrorism, support to an insurgency, and unconventional warfare are distinct components of irregular warfare. 29 As we discussed in the introduction to this paper, the relatively recent ascendency of COIN as the strategy that saved Iraq and is our best chance for success in Afghanistan is remarkable given that both these conflicts were well underway when this new doctrine emerged and was adopted. Counterinsurgency The fledgling government currently is precariously grasping for a unifying national identity that was erased over the past thirty years and replaced by a theocratic regime that was subsequently supplanted by the same interlopers that indirectly facilitated and sponsored its rise to power. Ethnic tensions are rife in Afghanistan and the only unifying nationalism lately has been the very theocratic regime that was overthrown by the interlopers.
Casus Belli and the role of the military
If the casus belli for many of these wars is ethno-national rivalry that has a long history of conflict associated with it, perhaps we are defining the very conflict inappropriately. Given the scope of conflict and sectarian violence these types of conflicts are more like civil wars than insurgencies. 32 Of course, these wars are handled quite differently at the policy level and are not mere small minorities that disavow loyalty to a government. These conflicts are for self determination and are driven by the ethnonational fear, honor and interests. Allowing that these may all provide a degree of impetus for initiating conflict there is one that is predominate at any given time on the continuum. This creates an interest asymmetry from the outset that frames the nature of the conflict for all parties involved. The peace operations umbrella allows for a strategy that can embrace both ethno-national populations from a neutral position that lends itself to legitimacy as a security force. By adopting a counterinsurgency strategy the party not in the majority will not view the external security force as impartial and therefore illegitimate and this by extension will make the government seem illegitimate and incapable of protecting the population's interest.
The three functions of military power are deterrence, compellence, and reassurance. 33 Examining these three functions from the whole of the population perspective should give us an indication which strategy gives the security forces the . 34 Seven of these traits are applicable and appropriate at the policy and strategic level.
Apolitical: A rather short sighted approach to the policy ends which the United States tries to achieve are perhaps driven by our four-year presidential electoral cycle.
These ends are often juxtaposed with a set of reasoned ends that may describe a longer, more expensive, and more uncertain end state; therefore they are often propagates anti colonial and anti imperial sentiments that historically we abhor and facilitated the dismantling of the European colonies through promotion of self determinism. 43 This is inherently at odds with a counterinsurgency strategy. When we address the actions we are taking in a literal manner are we also preventing in reality or actuality the natural process of self determination and are therefore imposing or maintaining a rather artificial environment. 44 Historically, the landmark inclusion of peace enforcement authority in the United Nations Charter, as already discussed, provides us with a complete historical rational for choosing peace operations and cautions us against a policy of regime change followed by counterinsurgent activities akin to the French in Algeria. 45 Counter insurgency operations are often a catalyst to creating humanitarian hardships for the disenfranchised, labeled as insurgent and discriminated against portions of the population, by making it difficult to for them the approach the government for redress of grievances or to operate economically within the structure without aligning with radical factions for protection. The disaffected often ally with those also in opposition to the government to prevent their being exposed by the extremists and thereby being at risk for targeting by the government and its military.
Peace operations do not take sides and therefore facilitate freedom of expression for all of the population without fear of collusion between the foreign security forces and the government. This characteristic forms a particularly powerful cultural bias in our strategic character as a nation; it is strong enough to force us into a counterfactual reasoning.
Prior to supporting the Sunni awakening and the birth of the Sons of Iraq, these were the insurgents whom the US had fought against in Iraq for since 2003, the disenfranchised Sunni insurgents were responsible for a significant portion of the attacks in Iraq. One could argue that the United States military facilitated, funded, and rearmed an insurgency in waiting through the Sons of Iraq program. Perhaps this was inspired in part by a need to reduce causalities in an effort to regain domestic support in America. In summary, as violence increased and causalities mounted the United States public aversion to casualties forced an abandonment of the offensive counterinsurgency strategy for a peace operations strategy of incentivizing an armistice of sorts.
The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have not concluded and history has yet to report on the success or failure of those endeavors. The peace is tenuous and the discussions about withdrawal of forces seem to be driving policy more so than regional stability. The conflicts in the Balkans and the Sinai have not concluded either and there is a general international consensus that regional stability is not in jeopardy and yet there is almost no discussion about withdrawal of forces. There are some lessons that can be divined by examining these conflicts to better inform our policy decisions.
Reminding us of the nature of war and conflict, why conflict exists, and acknowledging the casus belli of these conflicts will allow for a coherent policy to strategy linkage.
A strategy of peace operations, offers the United States a more flexible application of military force; greater collaboration with our allies; stronger intergovernmental partnerships; and a more inherently legitimate jus ad Bellum.
Counterinsurgency clearly has some tactical principles that are useful in these conflicts, but they are tenets that are shared by security and peace operations and therefore are not unique or original to the COIN tactic. Counterinsurgency as a strategy presupposes one has picked a side thereby enhancing their perceived legitimacy and subsequently their ability to strategically implement and communicate the jus ad Bellum. In the final analysis, a strategy of peace operations is less likely than counterinsurgency to undermine the very peace sought. 
